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The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 produced a ‘Grand Bargain’ between 
a range of major international donors and multilateral agencies. It embraces 
an efficiency and effectiveness agenda to bridge humanitarian financing gaps 
and advocates for improved coherency and complementarity of humanitarian 
and development interventions in crises contexts. Integral to the Grand 
Bargain is a localisation agenda that seeks to make ‘principled humanitarian 
action as local as possible’ and engage ‘with local and national responders in a 
spirit of partnership’. Based on research in Jordan and Lebanon, there are key 
considerations for designing and implementing humanitarian and development 
interventions in low-income urban areas governed by multiple public authorities.
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Who has claims to authority?
When millions of Syrians fleeing civil 
war sought refuge in Jordan and 
Lebanon from 2011, initial efforts 
by the international humanitarian 
community targeted supporting national 
governments. However, recognising the 
vital role of municipalities in providing 
support and services to those residing in 
their respective jurisdictions, the last five 
years have seen a strong shift towards 
supporting municipalities. There are, 
however, good grounds to consider that, 
significantly, municipalities are not the 
only local actor governing (the relations 
between host and) displaced populations 
in urban areas.
In conflict-affected or post-conflict urban 
settings, multiple actors contest the 
exercise of public authority, especially 
in low-income areas. These can include 
a wide range of governance actors, 
from ‘big men’, traditional leaders, 
tribal networks, criminal gangs, labour 
brokers, militias, faith-based groups, local 
committees and others. 
This is particularly true for low-income 
urban areas of Lebanon and Jordan, where 
the ‘Public Authority and Legitimacy 
Making’ (PALM) project identified tribal 
networks (especially in Jordan) and 
political parties (Lebanon), international 
UN agencies, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation as amongst groups asserting 
public authority. These actors, while 
distinct, commonly straddle the state and 
the non-state, the public and the private, 
and the formal and the informal. Like 
the local state, non-state actors need 
to legitimise their claims to authority. 
They do so firstly by drawing on a range 
of sources of legitimacy, including 
charismatic leadership, popular consent, 
and legal status. Secondly, they derive 
legitimacy from exercising core functions 
of authority, notably providing welfare 
(e.g. health, education); security and 
conflict resolution; controlling territory 
and monitoring populations.
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Shifting focus onto municipalities
There are key considerations for humanitarian 
and development agencies aiming to reach 
out to vulnerable populations in the most 
impoverished and marginalised urban areas of 
Lebanon and Jordan.
Donors are increasingly directing support towards 
municipalities and mayors, seeking to strengthen 
their capacities to act on growing mandates as 
local authority. Municipalities in both Jordan and 
Lebanon include highly urbanised areas as well as 
low-density populations in rural areas. However, 
municipal capacities to respond to protracted 
displacement or acute crises are not necessarily 
related to population size, or to the complex 
needs of mixed resident groups. 
Decentralisation processes are reshaping the 
governance of urban environments in Jordan. 
Municipal authorities have been imbued with new 
mandates and powers, leading to competition for 
authority with established actors such as Members 
of Parliament for local support, and new routes 
for tribal networks to mould state patronage. 
Simultaneously, as resources are not significantly 
increasing, local community-based organisations, 
whose human resource and organisational 
capacities have been developed since 2011, 
are now facing much tougher competition for 
funding and survival. 
In Lebanon, decentralisation is incomplete. 
Municipal authorities’ mandates are not matched 
with adequate financial and administrative 
capacities. Moreover, municipalities’ room for 
manoeuvre is often stymied by governorate or 
central-level decision-making processes and actors, 
to create space for non-state actors to step in. 
Whereas international aid agendas underline 
the role of municipalities, municipalities cannot 
be assumed willing and incentivised to be 
accountable to residents. Non-citizens, including 
international migrants, stateless people, and 
refugees have no political representation in 
these local bodies of state. Furthermore, large 
proportions of Lebanese residents of urban areas 
are registered to vote in their native villages, so 
municipalities neither politically represent nor are 
accountable to these groups. 
This disenfranchisement is enduring too, as terms 
in office are long (six years), and parties’ hold over 
municipal councils is often lasting. In Jordan, tribes 
were found to pre-select candidates for municipal 
elections, in turn preventing non-members 
from standing for office (e.g. Ma’an city) and 
disincentivising municipalities from appealing to 
and being accountable to community members 
outside of their voter base (i.e. their tribe). 
Whereas in Jordan the state has been supporting 
urban informal settlement upgrading for many 
years, Lebanese law forbids municipalities from 
providing otherwise mandated services to such 
neighbourhoods. Yet, these chronically under-
serviced neighbourhoods host large numbers of 
vulnerable refugees, economic migrants and host 
communities, while precarious living environments 
and competition for scarce resources may provide 
fertile ground for conflict. 
Many Lebanese municipalities refrain from 
servicing informal areas for fear of legitimising 
their existence and of violating the law. Yet, in 
some areas, governing actors have found ways to 
improve the condition of informal settlements. 
After Israeli bombardments in 2006, Hezbollah 
led the successful ‘build back better’ campaign in 
Ghobeiry (Beirut), whereas the municipality of 
Sour has institutionalised practices that enable 
Lebanese residents, but not stateless Palestinian 
inhabitants, to circumvent required building 
licenses to improve housing infrastructures. It is 
not clear what kind of politics allow for these local 
authority innovations to emerge. 
As non-state actors step into the vacuum left by 
municipalities’ lack of engagement in marginalised 
areas in Lebanon to provide security and welfare 
to resident populations, it is unclear if, and through 
what mechanisms, accountability can be achieved. 
This question also applies to humanitarian and 
development partners, whose accountability may 
well be tested by Syrian refugees, who are often 
more aware of services and responsibilities of 
international actors than local citizens. 
Programming in low-income urban 
settings in Jordan and Lebanon 
Humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence) potentially enable 
international responders to work with all at 
the city or neighbourhood level, including state 
and non-state, and formal and informal actors. 
However, humanitarian interventions can be 
framed as non-neutral and non-impartial in the 
sense that they can support or deny the legitimacy 
of local actors seeking to exercise authority. 
Municipalities often demand to provide permission 
to access hard-to-reach communities, and 
interventions can be viewed as sanctioned by or 
extending municipal authority. In environments 
where obtaining health, education, water, and 
other services is not a matter of rights, but often 
bestowed by patronage, non-state authorities also 
seek to broker aid for vulnerable populations to 
underwrite their claims to legitimate authority. 
Non-state actors claiming public authority should 
not be ignored by international aid agendas 
focusing on municipalities. 
1. These actors can facilitate or deny access 
to the most vulnerable populations living in 
the most fragile urban areas. In Lebanon, 
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multilateral (and other) agencies as a rule seek 
to get endorsement for programmes from 
a municipality. However, non-state actors as 
well as central government authorities are 
known to stop interventions, despite municipal 
endorsement, for security and other reasons. 
Obtaining municipal endorsement, while 
important, is not always enough for enabling 
effective and efficient humanitarian and 
development programming. 
2. A thorough understanding of the role of 
non-state actors in de facto as well as de jure 
urban governance may be important for 
winning support from the targeted recipients 
of programming. Populations may distrust 
absent municipal authorities, while non-state 
actors that provide important security, welfare, 
and conflict resolution services may be seen to 
carry significant legitimacy. 
Although an emphasis on municipalities suggests 
a certain homogeneity, donors’ abilities to 
engage varies substantially across and even 
within municipalities. In Jordan, tribal networks 
significantly penetrate the state, where a 
social contract of the state providing ghost 
jobs assures the enduring support for the state 
from key tribes. Mayors of the Islamic Action 
Front affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
use hostile language towards Western donors, 
yet are found to be willing to implement 
programmes in, for example, the city of Zarqa. 
In Jordan, donors deem tribal authorities to 
be insufficiently inclusive of women, refugees 
and other vulnerable populations; aid is 
directed towards producing new civil society 
organisations, whose sustainability and local 
legitimacy yet remain unproven. In Lebanon, 
Hezbollah is elected into state offices (from 
municipal council to parliament) and governs 
large swaths of impoverished urban areas, yet 
it is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by 
several Western countries including the US, UK, 
Canada and the Netherlands. The party itself also 
significantly shapes both the geographical and 
substantive terrain of possibilities for intervening 
by international humanitarian and development 
agencies, and the ability of donors to provide 
support, by scrutinising and (dis)allowing 
prospective programmes.
High-value aid programmes can influence 
local governance actors. If there are actors or 
areas that are not receiving attention from 
government donors, private donors can potentially 
step in. Bringing their own monies allows for 
bargaining with donors to enable flexibility and 
a more equitable distribution of aid to areas and 
people based on needs. Accordingly, one INGO 
reported that negotiation with public authorities 
allowed it to operate in donor-identified as well 
as in own priority identified neighbourhoods. 
Such bargaining space is dependent on the size 
and value of the programme, suggesting also that 
collaborative efforts between private and 
government donors can be effective in accessing 
otherwise hard-to-reach areas. However, care is 
needed to avoid passing responsibility for who 
deals with non-state public authorities to smaller 
actors with less resources to manage efforts 
within the frameworks and expectations of the 
international community.
Humanitarian and development activities critical 
to achieving human protection objectives may 
be in tension with the attainment of geopolitical 
goals of stabilisation and state-building, 
where the former (intentionally or otherwise) 
underwrite the legitimacy of local non-state 
actors. However, the reverse may be true too, 
where the absence of programming by municipal 
authorities and the international community 
allows non-state actor service providers to be the 
only authority in the area. 
In the case of Hezbollah, some donors 
proscribe both military and political wings of 
Hezbollah, others only proscribe the former, 
allowing space to engage in humanitarian 
dialogue and programming. Implementing 
partners face the dilemma of navigating 
diverse donor strictures on the one hand, and 
respecting the democratically elected office of 
mayors, municipal councillors, parliamentarians, 
and appointed offices of cabinet ministers 
on the other. Ignoring some political parties 
governing specific urban areas, while supporting 
others, may make it impossible to develop 
municipal capacities while also unjustifiably 
punish people living in these areas, whether 
they are supportive of the party in control, or 
not. The balance of aid distribution may also 
affect a fragile balance of power between 
political parties and thus undermine efforts 
to maintain stability. Proscription policies thus 
may be at risk of compromising humanitarian 
values by privileging geopolitical interests of 
donor countries. 
Five considerations for humanitarian 
and development actors
Responders should recognise that local state and 
non-state authorities draw on a range of claims 
to legitimacy, by providing welfare, security and 
conflict resolution, controlling territory and 
monitoring populations. Humanitarian actions, 
whether conducted or withheld, intervene in 
local struggles for power and authority, as a 
source of legitimacy. 
1. It is important for international humanitarian 
or development actors to establish strong 
context analysis for effective programme 
design. This needs to be done at local area or 
neighbourhood level and include stakeholder 
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mapping, analysis, and simultaneous equal engagement 
with state and non-state actors to build productive 
relationships ahead of programmatic interventions.
Analysis should not overstate the division between 
formal and informal actors. In many cases they are 
intricately related, with non-state actors aiming to 
influence government action, and governments seeking 
to shape the behaviours of the former. The ability to 
engage with non-state public authorities in low-income 
urban areas, and on what terms, is shaped by the 
latter’s willingness to engage, as well as by donor and 
organisational policies and practices. 
2. Significant effort is needed on communicating with 
communities to build meaningful consensus on 
programme objectives before a programme starts. This 
is time-consuming and resource-intensive yet critical, as 
the order in which stakeholders are engaged is important 
and can close doors later if one makes a misstep early on. 
3. Greater dialogue between implementing partners and 
donors is needed to understand how to sensitively deal 
with competing multiple authorities in urban low-
income areas, and to effectively learn from experience. 
Whereas political intelligence supports donor 
international aid efforts, including through embassies, 
organisations in the humanitarian–development nexus do 
not necessarily benefit from such insight. Donors could 
provide more practical guidance on how to operate 
with non-state public authorities that are deemed 
exclusionary (of women, tribes, sectarian groups, etc). 
Aid actors may attempt to directly or indirectly influence 
the norms underlying legitimacy-making or disengage 
altogether. Similarly, where proscription policies apply, 
they can give greater clarity on red lines that are not to 
be crossed, as implementers are operating within an 
increasingly risk-averse funding environment. Moreover, 
aid agencies should be encouraged to give feedback to 
donors’ operational realities in trying to reach complex, 
high-need areas.
4. Increased emphasis on the role of the UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator is needed to do more to 
negotiate access with local public authorities to allow 
implementation of agencies within the Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan (LCRP) or other response frameworks, 
and to ensure that ‘hard-to-reach areas’ are still 
receiving a wide array of support. Actively linking 
humanitarian to development interventions, as envisaged 
in the Grand Bargain, in theory provides for longer-term 
programmes that allow for including a wider range of 
partners and building up necessary trust with non-state 
public authorities. Yet, whereas this calls for multi-year 
funding, humanitarian interventions in particular tend to 
have short funding and programming cycles. 
5. Due to the extremely limited existing literature on 
the subject, there is an acute need for substantial 
primary data collection to support deeper knowledge 
and assessment tools for assessing the legitimacy effects 
of humanitarian and development interventions for state 
(including municipal) and non-state actors governing 
low-income urban informal settings. 
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